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FIRST AMENDMENT-ATTORNEY SOLICITATION
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 98 S. Ct. 1912 (1978).
In Re Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978).
INTRODUCTION
After finding in its last term that the first amend-
ment protected the restrained and truthful news-
paper advertisements of attorneys,' the United
States Supreme Court this term considered for the
first time whether attorneys' in-person solicitation
of clients was similarly protected. Two disparate
cases were presented. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association,2 the Court found 3 that "the Bar-acting
with state authorization-constitutionally may dis-
cipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for
pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose
dangers that the State has a right to prevent."4
Those circumstances involved a lawyer's visits to a
-hospitalized accident victim,5 secret tape record-
ings of conversations with his prospective "clients"
to assure proof of their assent to his representation,
refusal to withdraw from the case upon request,
and lawsuits filed by him against the "clients" for
their alleged breach of contract. That, according
to the Court, constituted purely commercial and
unprotected conduct.6 By contrast, in In re Primus7
the Court found' that the first amendment's "zone
of associational freedoms" did protect the solicita-
tion of an A.C.L.U. attorney, found by the Court
to have been motivated not by financial gain but
by a desire to express political and associational
beliefs.9 The attorney in Primus spoke to a group
concerning their legal rights, suggested the possi-
bility of a lawsuit, and later offered aid through
the A.C.L.U.'s legal services.
'Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. 1912
(1978).
'The vote of the Justices in Ohralik was 6-2-0, Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment; Rehnquist, J., concurring; and Brennan, J., taking
no part in the decision.
498 S. Ct. at 1915.
5 The accident victim was in the hospital and in trac-
tion when attorney Ohralik solicited her. Id
rIn re Primus, 98 S. Ct. 1893, 1899 (1978) (interpreting
the holding in Ghralik). See note 87 infnr.
7 98 S. Ct. 1893 (1978).
8In Primus the vote was 5-2-1, Marshall, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment; Blackmun, J.,
concurring; Rehnquist,J, dissenting; Brennan, J., taking
no part in the decision.
9 98 S. Ct. at 1902-05.
The Court expressly limited these decisions to
their respective fact situations. 10 The Court did not
state whether the first amendment would protect
attorney solicitation falling somewhere between
these extremes. Such solicitation-labelled "be-
nign" commercial solicitation by Justice Mar-
shall-would involve:
advice and information that is truthful and that is
presented in a noncoercive, nondeceitful and digni-
fied manner to a potential client who is emotionally
and physically capable of making a rational decision
either to accept or reject the representation with
respect to a legal claim or matter that is not frivo-
lous."
OHRALIK V. OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
In Ohralik, appellant Albert Ohralik, a member
of the Ohio Bar, contacted the family of a young
-woman, Carol McClintock, with whom he was
casually acquainted, after learning that she and
her friend were injured in an automobile accident.
Ohralik was subsequently invited to the Mc-
Clintock's home. There he answered questions
about the family's liability to suit and suggested
that they hire a lawyer. Having been told that the
decision was up to Carol, Ohralik proceeded to
visit her in the hospital, where she was lying in her
' The Ohralik Court reached its decision "on the basis
of the undisputed facts of record." 98 S. Ct. at 1924. The
Court held that although the lower court had not found
proof of any actual harm, in light of the state's interest in
preventing the potential evils associated with solicitation
the absence of specific proof of harm was immaterial.
"The facts in this case present a striking example of the
potential for overreaching tha t is inherent in a lawyer's
in-person solicitation of professional employment." L at
1925.
In Primus the Court specifically limited its decision to
the fact situation before it in phrasing the issue.
We consider on this appeal whether a State may
punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further
political and ideological goals through associational
activity, including litigation, advises a lay person of
her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter
that free legal assistance is available from a non-
profit organization with which the lawyer and her
associates are affiliated.
98 S. Ct. at 1895.
"198 S. Ct. at 1927 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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room in traction. Ohralik told Carol that he would
represent her and asked her to sign an agreement
to that effect. She agreed to discuss the matter with
her parents. Ohralik then returned to the Mc-
Clintock residence, this time carrying a concealed
tape recorder. After re-examining the McClintock's
insurance policy, Ohralik learned that it included
an uninsured motorist clause that would provide
benefits to both victims. He informed Carol's par-
ents that they could sue for these benefits and was
told that their daughter had called to agree to
Ohralik's representation. Two days later, Ohralik
returned to the hospital to have Carol sign a con-
tract which entitled Ohralik to one-third of Carol's
anticipated recovery.
1 2
Ohralik also visited the second injured woman,
Wanda Lou Holbert, and again secretly recorded
the conversation. He informed Wanda that he was
handling her friend Carol's case and that she was
eligible for benefits under the McClintock's insur-
ance policy. In response to Ohralik's query about
whether Wanda would file a claim, Wanda replied
that she "did not understand what was going on."'
3
However, in response to Ohralik's offer to represent
her, Wanda replied, "OK.'
14
Subsequently Wanda's mother attempted to re-
pudiate her daughter's assent, but Ohralik insisted
that Wanda had entered into a binding agreement.
One month later Wanda confirmed in writing that
she did not wish to be represented. Carol Mc-
Clintock also eventually discharged Ohralik. Ohr-
alik filed breach of contract suits against both
women. In settlement, Carol McClintock paid
Ohralik one-third of her insurance proceeds, which
had been obtained through the efforts of another
lawyer.'
5
Both women filed complaints against Ohralik
with the Grievance Committee of the County Bar
Association, which in turn filed a formal complaint
with the Ohio Supreme Court's Board of Commis-
sioners on Grievances and Discipline. The Board
found that Ohralik had violated two Disciplinary
Rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsi-
12 98 S. Ct. at 1915-16.
13 Id. at 1916.
14 id.
51d. at 1916-17. Ohralik initially abandoned his
breach of contract claim against Wanda Lou Holbert,
apparently because he felt an ethical question could arise
from a contract having its origin in controversy. However,
Ohralik filed a suit against Wanda after his disciplinary
hearing. Ohralik dismissed this suit with prejudice after
the rendering of the Ohio Supreme Court decision. Id. at
1917 n.7.
bility. t 6 The Board rejected Ohralik's claim that
his conduct was protected under the first and
fourteenth amendments, and recommended that
Ohralik be given a public reprimand. The Ohio
Supreme Court, agreeing with the Board that Ohr-
alik's conduct was not constitutionally protected,
increased the punishment to indefinite suspen-
sion.1
7
On Ohralik's appeal, the United States Supreme
Court, speaking through Justice Powell, stated that
it would answer in part the question of first
amendment protection of attorney in-person solic-
itation.' Powell explained that the issue was not
controlled by Bates v. State Bar of Arizona (lawyers'
truthful newspaper advertisements protected by
the first amendment),' 9 or by Virginia State Board of.
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, Inc.
(first amendment protected a pharmacist's purely
commercial advertisement).' The Ohralik opinion
found that advertising and solicitation had differ-
ent degrees of first amendment protection and that
the state had different countervailing interests in
regulating the two activities.
2
'
Ohralik had argued that his solicitation of
clients, like advertising, served two important pur-
poses: it apprised clients of their legal rights and
informed them of the availability of a lawyer.
Therefore, Ohralik reasoned, the state must show
that its regulations dealt solely with an actual harm
which the state had a compelling interest in deter-
ring.
The Court responded that "in-person solicitation
of professional employment by a lawyer does not
's DR 2-103(A) of the Ohio Code provides:
"A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as
a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or
associate to a non-lawyer who has not sought his
advice regarding employment of a lawyer."
DR 2-104(A) provides in relevant part:
"A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a
layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal
action shall not accept employment resulting from
that advice, except that:
"(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close
friend, relative, former client (if the advice is ger-
mane to the former employment), or one whom the
lawyer reasonably believes to be a client."
Id. at 1917 n.9.
17 Id. at 1917.
'
8 Id. at 1915.
19 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2o 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
21 98 S. Ct. at 1918. It was never clearly established in
the opinion what the difference was between the degrees
of first amendment protection of the activities in Virginia
Bd. and those in Ohralik
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stand on a par with truthful advertising about the
availability and terms of routine legal services, let
alone with forms of speech more traditionally
within the concern of the First Amendment." 22 In
support of this, the Court noted its recent conclu-
sion in Virginia Board that there exists a "common-
sense" distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech.23 Furthermore, the Court de-
fined this distinction by noting that "speech pro-
posing a commercial transaction ... occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regula-
tion." 2' The Court concluded that commercial
speech was given only limited constitutional pro-
tection to avoid dilution of the first amendment
protection afforded non-commercial speech, which
it was feared would occur if the scope of full first
amendment protection was broadened to include
commercial speech.2s
The Court distinguished pure speech from con-
duct which involved some speech elements. The
Court stated that the first amendment permits
regulation of conduct even if a substantial part of
that conduct was "initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written,
or printed." 26 Examples of government regulation
of written or spoken 'conduct' included the ex-
change of information about securities, 7 corporate
proxy statements,s exchange of price information
by competitors,2 and employer's threats of retal-
iation for their employees' union activities.'
Similarly, the Court found that Bates was not
controlling because different state interests were
involved in that case. The Court noted that solici-
tation may involve more pressure than the adver-
tising permitted in Bates and that it often demands
2298 S. Ct. at 1918. It might be well to note at this
point Justice Marshall's view of the correlation between
advertising and solicitation. "The relevant comparison,
however, at least is between truthful in-person solicitation
of employment and truthful advertising." 98 S. Ct. at
1928 n.5 (Marshall, J., concurring) (original emphasis).
2 98 S. Ct. at 1918 (citing 425 U.S. at 771 n.24).
4 id.
25d
2 Id. at 1918-19 (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage
& Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)).
27Id. at 1919 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969)).
8 Id. (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S.
375 (1970)).
2Id. (citing American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921)).
' Id. (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575
(1969)).
an immediate response without affording an op-
portunity for reflection or comparison. Thus, solic-
itation may encourage speedy and uninformed
decision-making. Indeed, the Court found that in-
person solicitation is "as likely as not" to discourage
people from "engaging in critical comparison[s] of
the 'availability, nature and prices' of legal serv-
ices. ' The Court concluded that in-person solici-
tation might actually disserve the Bates goal of
fostering informed and reliable decision-making. It
was only through a footnote that the Court recog-
nized the value and necessity of providing infor-
mation about the availability of legal services to
low and middle income individuals.3
2
The Court further noted that the State regula-
tions against solicitation did not prohibit the dis-
semination of information about legal rights and
remedies. What was prohibited was "using the
information as bait with which to obtain an agree-
ment to represent [the people approached] for a
fee."3 However, the Court offered no further ex-
planation as to why such conduct could be regu-
lated. Finally, the Court noted that Ohralik's con-
duct did not fall into one of the areas of tradition-
ally protected activity-political expression, asso-
ciational freedom or mutual assistance.3
4
In conclusion, the Court stated that "[a] lawyer's
procurement of remunerative employment is ...
only marginally affected with First Amendment
concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere
of economic and professional regulation." ' The
Court found that the limited first amendment
protection of Ohralik's solicitation, therefore, per-
mitted regulation in furtherance of important state
interests, including a general concern for the pro-
31 Id. at 1919 (quoting 433 U.S. at 364). The Court
provided no support for its assertion that these evils had,
in fact, occurred. Nor did the Court quote statistics
tending to show that the results feared were "as likely as
not" to occur.
32 Id. at 1919 n.15. This subordination of the right of
consumers to information reflects a remarkable change
in attitude from Virginia Bd. and Bates, where the Court
emphasized the right of consumers to a "free flow of
information." 433 U.S. at 364; 425 U.S. at 757.
3 98 S. Ct. at 1920.
34 Id. The Court acknowledged that this contention
was not made by Ohralik.
35 Id. (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439-43
(1963)). Button recognized differences in traditional areas
of government regulation and other commercial speech,
however. Hence the Button Court speaks not solely of a
pecuniary gain motivation but of "private gain, seving no
public interest," 371 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added), and
"oppressive, malicious or avaricious use of the legal process
for purely private gain." Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
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tection of consumers and regulation of commercial
transactions, and a special responsibility for main-
tenance of professional standards. The evils of so-
licitation were said to include the possibility of
"stirring up litigation, assertion of fraudulent
claims, debasing the legal profession, and potential
harm to the solicited client in the form of over-
reaching, overcharging, underrepresentation, and
misrepresentation. 36 The Court admitted that
these were "sweeping terms,"37 but found it unnec-
essary to explain how the broadly-described evils
were directly associated with solicitation. Ohralik
had conceded that "the State has a 'compelling'
interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation
that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation,
overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious con-
duct. ' ' as Since Ohralik recognized the existence of
important state interests in the regulation of solic-
itation, the Court concluded, there could be no
further dispute that application of the State regu-
lations to Ohralik's activity was constitutional.
Although Ohralik conceded that the state might
regulate certain evils of solicitation, he argued that
none of those evils were present in his activities.
Ohralik claimed that the Court must determine
not whether the state could regulate hypothetical
evils of solicitation, but whether the state could
regulate solicitation per se, regardless of whether
those evils were found to be present.
The Court purportedly agreed with Ohralik that
"the appropriate focus is on appellant's conduct. ' 'ss
However, the Court went on to note that "[a]p-
pellant's argument misconceives the nature of the
State's interest [in prophylactic regulation]."40
Thus, the actual focus of the Court's discussion was
not on the "appellant's conduct" but on the gen-
eral, potential harms which the State's prophylac-
tic regulations were designed to prevent.4
The Court concluded that Ohralik's solicitation
created a situation that was "inherently conducive
to overreaching and other forms of misconduct,
42
3 98 S. Ct. at 1921.
37 Id.
3 Id. at 1922 (citing the appellant's brief).
3Id. at 1923. The Court had previously discussed and
discarded an overbreadth argument, noting that since
Bates it was recognized that the overbreadth standard
was not applicable to commercial speech. 98 S. Ct. at
1922 n.20.
40 Id. at 1923.
" No authority was cited to support the proposition
that a state may validly enact prophylactic regulations
in the area of even limited first amendment rights.
4298 S. Ct. at 1923.
and that the State appropriately perceived "the
potential for harm in circumstances such as those
present in this case."' 3 In support of this conclusion,
the Court cited studies of the detrimental effects of
the door-to-door selling industry.44 Comparing
lawyers who solicit clients with door-to-door sales-
men of ordinary consumer products, the Court
warned that the problems inherent in the door-'to-
door selling industry would be multiplied when "a
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persua-
sion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured,
or distressed lay person.' ' 5 The Court concluded,
"it is not unreasonable for the State to presume
that in-person solicitation by lawyers more often
than not will be injurious to the person solicited."' 6
The Court finally noted that requiring proof of
actual injury in each case would be difficult, since
solicitation was by nature more private than ad-
vertising.4 7 If proof of actual harm were required,
the Court reasoned, effective oversight and regu-
lation by the state or legal profession would be
effectively eliminated. Hence, the Court held that
prophylactic regulations did not unduly infringe
the limited first amendment protection of commer-
cial solicitation. The Court therefore held that
Ohio Disciplinary Rules DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-
104(A), were not unconstitutional.
43 id.
44 Id. at 1923 n.23. One source cited observed "It]he
door to door selling technique strips from the consumer
one of the fundamentals in his role as an informed
purchaser, the decision as to when, where, and how he
will present himself to the market place...." Id. (quoting
37 Fed. Reg. at 22939 n.44).
4" Id. at 1923. Among the specific harms feared were
invasion of privacy and obtrusiveness. In note 25 the
Court also cited Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951), in support of the contention that a solicited
individual may be distressed by even a well-meaning
lawyer. 98 S. Ct. at 1924 n.25. However, Brcard dealt not
with a professional such as a lawyer who is trained not
only in persuasion but also in high moral standards.
Breard dealt with a door-to-door salesman of magazines.
98 S. Ct. at 1924 (footnote omitted). The Court's
conclusion that injury would occur "more often than
not," is in direct contradiction to its positive outlook in
Bates. In Bates, in an equally unsupported statement, the
Court found "one to thousands" odds in favor of princi-
pled lawyers. 433 U.S. at 379.
47 98 S. Ct. at 1924. The foreseeable difficulties in proof
mentioned by the Court included the fact that unlike
advertising, in-person solicitation is not visible or other-
wise open to public scrutiny. Also, often there is no other
witness than the person solicited and the lawyer. And it
was feared that the person solicited, if distressed, would




In In re Primus, appellant Edna Smith Primus
was a lawyer associated with a South Carolina
firm. She also served as an uncompensated officer
and cooperating lawyer with the A.C.LU. and was
paid a retainer for her work as legal consultant for
the South Carolina Council on Human Relations,
a local nonprofit organization. The case before the
Court arose when Primus accepted an invitation
of the Council to speak to a group of women who
had been sterilized as a condition of continued
receipt of medical assistance. Primus informed the
women of their legal rights and suggested the
possibility of filing a-lawsuit. Approximately one
month later, the A.C.L.U. informed Primus that it
was willing to provide legal assistance to these
women. Having been informed that one of the
participants in the earlier meeting, Mrs. Williams,
wished to file a suit, Primus extended the
A.C.L.U.'s offer of free legal representation to her
in a letter. Subsequently, Williams showed the
letter to the doctor who would have been sued. She
then informed Primus that she did not intend to
sue. No further communication was had between
Williams and Primus.4
Meanwhile, the lawyer representing Williams'
doctor filed a complaint with the Board of Com-
missioners of Grievances and Discipline of the
South Carolina Supreme Court, based upon the
letter of Primus to Williams. The lawyer claimed
that the letter was "solicitation in violation of the
Canons of Ethics.'"49 The Board found Primus
guilty of violating Disciplinary Rules 2-
103(D)(5)(a) and (c) and 2-104(A)(5) of the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina," and recom-
48 98 S. Ct. at 1897.
4 9 Ad.
,0 South Carolina's Disciplinary Rule 2-103(D) pro-
vides:
"(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person
or organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays
for legal services to promote the use of his services
or those of his partners or associates. However, he
may cooperate in a dignified manner with the legal
service activities of any of the following, provided
that his independent professional judgment is exer-
cised in behalf of his client without interference or
control by any organization or other person:
"(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
"(a) Operated or sponsored by a duly accredited
law school.
"(b) Operated or sponsored by a bona fide non-
profit community organization.
"(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental
agency.
"(d) Operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar
association representative of the general bar of the
mended that a private reprimand be issued. The
South Carolina rules were such that DR 2-
geographical area in which the association exists.
"(2) A military legal assistance office.
"(3) A lawyer referral service operated, sponsored,
or approved by a bar association representative of
the general bar of the geographical area in which
the association exists.
"(4) A bar association representative of the general
bar of the geographical area in which the association
exists.
"(5) Any other non-profit organization that recom-
mends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its
members or beneficiaries, but only in those instances
and to the extent that controlling constitutional
interpretation at the time of the rendition of the
services requires the allowance of such legal service
activities, and only if the following conditions, un-
less prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
"(a) The primary purposes of such organization
do not include the rendition of legal services.
"(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying
for legal services to its members is incidental and
reasonably related to the primary purposes of such
organization.
"(c) Such organization does not derive a financial
benefit from the rendition of legal services by the
lawyer.
"(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the
legal services are rendered, and not such organiza-
tion, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in that
matter."
Id. at 1898 n.10.
South Carolina's Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A) pro-
vides:
"(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to
a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal
action shall not accept employment resulting from
that advice, except that:
"(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close
friend, relative, former client (if the advice is ger-
mane to the former employment), or one whom the
lawyer reasonably believes to be a client.
"(2) A lawyer may accept employment that re-
sults from his participation in activities designed to
educate laymen to recognize legal problems, to
make intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize
available legal services if such activities are con-
ducted or sponsored by any of the offices or orga-
nizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1) through
(5), to the extent and under the conditions pre-
scribed therein.
"(3) A lawyer who is furnished or paid by any of
the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-
103(D)(1), (2), or (5) may represent a member or
beneficiary thereof to the extent and under the
conditions prescribed therein.
"(4) Without affecting his right to accept em-
ployment, a lawyer may speak publicly or write for
publication on legal topics so long as he does not
emphasize his own professional experience or repu-
tation and does not undertake to give individual
advice-
"(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of
1978]
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103(D)(5) recognized the constitutional rights in
question as protecting an attorney cooperating
with legal service activities only when:
"(a) The primary purposes of such organizations do
not include the rendition of legal services.
"(b) The recommending, furnishing, or paying for
legal services to its members is incidental and rea-
sonably related to the primary purpose of such or-
ganization.
"(c) Such organization does not derive a financial
benefit from the rendition of legal services by the
lawyer.
"(d) The member or beneficiary for whom the legal
services are rendered, and not such organization, is
recognized as the client of the lawyer in that mat-
ter.
,51
The court found that the A.C.L.U. failed to meet
conditions (a) and (c) because it has as its primary
purpose the rendition of legal services, and because
it might benefit financially from a successful pros-
ecution of the suit for money damages. The court
therefore held that Primus' activity was not consti-
tutionally protected and increased the Board's rec-
ommended sanction to a public reprimand.
52
In reversing, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized that the solicitation in Primus was pro-
tected speech because it was motivated by a desire
to express political and associational views,s5
whereas the unprotected solicitation in Ohralik in-
volved a purely commercial motivation.54 The
Court said that the ultimate question in Primus was
whether, "in light of the values protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments, these differ-
ences [in motivation] materially affect the scope of
state regulation of the conduct of lawyers."' Not-
ing the difference between the regulation of com-
mercial affairs and of political expression or asso-
ciational freedoms, the Court stated:
The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, ... that
the State may proscribe in-person solicitation for
pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result
his client in litigation in the nature of a class action
is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer
may accept, but shall not seek, employment from
those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their
joinder."
Id. at 1898 n.ll.
5' Id. at 1898 n.10.
52 In re Edna Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301
(1977).
5398 S. Ct. at 1900.
4 Id. at 1899. See also id at 1906, 1908.
m Id. at 1900.
in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to ap-
pellant's activity on behalf of the ACLU. Although
a showing of potential danger may suffice in the
former context, appellant may not be disciplined
unless her activity in fact involved the type of mis-
conduct at which South Carolina's broad prohibi-
tion is said to be directed. 56
The Court then discussed the actual Primus solici-
tation-not in light of the rationale used in Chralik
but, instead, in relation to that used in NAACP v.
Button'
In Button, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed a state court decision which had held that
the activities of N.A.A.C.P. attorneys consitituted
"solicitation of legal business" in violation of state
law.58 The Court found that the state regulation
sought to limit expression and associational activ-
ity, and that such regulation could only be done
"with narrow specificity., 59 The Attorney General
of Virginia in Button had used many of the justifi-
cations for state regulation of solicitation later ad-
vanced in Ohralik.60 However, unlike Ohralik, where
these interests were held to. be sufficient to justify
prophylactic regulations by the state, in Button the
state was deemed to have "failed to advance any
substantial regulatory interest in the form of sub-
stantive evils flowing from [the N.A.A.C.P.'s] activ-
ities, which can justify the broad prohibitions
which it has imposed."6'
In Primus, the Court recognized that its interpre-
tations of Button established the principle that "col-
lective activity undertaken to obtain meaningful
access to the courts is a fundamental right within
the protection of the First Amendment. 6 2 Primus
also reiterated the principle that a state may seek
to correct the substantive evils of undue influence,
"6 Id. at 1906 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). By
categorizing Primus' activity as political expression, the
Court avoided the Ohralik inquiry of whether the activity
was commercial or non-commercial, speech or conduct.
57371 U.S. 415 (1963).
8 Id. at 428-29.
59Id. at 433, quoted in 98 S. Ct. at 1900.
" Among the evils were lay control of the litigation
process and the traditional evils of common-law mainte-
nance, champerty, and barratry. In re Primus, 98 S. Ct.
at 1900 (citing 371 U.S. at 438). See Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. at 1921.
6i 98 S. Ct. at 1901 (quoting 371 U.S. at 444). Specif-
ically the state failed to prove a malicious intent or that
the prospect of pecuniary gain motivated the N.A.A.C.P.
62 98 S. Ct. at 1901 (quoting United Transportation
Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971)). See
433 U.S. at 376 n.32.
[Vol. 69
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of pri-
vacy and lay interference resulting from solicita-
tion-but such regulations may not significantly
impair associational freedoms.
63
The lower court decision in Primus" had stressed
that in Button, the N.A.A.C.P. was primarily a
political organization, whereas in the instant case
the A.C.L.U. principally sought to render legal
services. However, the Supreme Court disagreed
with that distinction based on the history of the
A.C.L.U. and its work with controversial issues and
unpopular defendants. The Court found that in
the A.C.L.U., as in the N.A.A.C.P., litigation was
not a "technique of resolving differences" but
rather "a form of political expression" and "polit-
ical association." 65 The Court was also unper-
suaded by the suggestion that, since the A.C.L.U.
had requested counsel fees in Primus, it was there-
fore motivated by financial gain. The Court rea-
soned that since counsel fees were awarded only at
the discretion of the courts, a fee request did not
indicate a motive of pecuniary gain. Furthermore,
Primus and the A.C.L.U.'s lawyers would not per-
sonally share in any monetary recovery. 6
The Primus Court emphasized that "exacting
scrutiny" must be applied in evaluating govern-
ment regulations of'associational freedoms. 67 The
state must demonstrate a subordinating and com-
pelling interestr8 and must regulate in a way that
avoids unnecessary infringement of first amend-
ment rights.69 In light of this standard, the Court
considered the state interests asserted in
63 98 S. Ct. at 1902 (citing United Mine Workers of
America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222
(1967)).
' In re Edna Smith, 268 S.C.*259, 233 S.E.2d 301
(1977).
65 98 S. Ct. at 1902-03 (quoting 371 U.S. at 429, 431).
'The Court chose to ignore the conjecture found in
note 21 that Primus might have benefitted financially
through her increased reputation or as a result of any
award of counsel fees to the attorneys with whom she
associated in an expense-sharing arrangement. 98 S. Ct.
at 1902 n.21. This financial motivation and the new
policy of the A.C.L.U. to award individual attorneys
counsel fees, id. at 1904 n.25, pre possible points for
distinguishing future cases.
67 Id. at 1905 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
44-45 (1976)).
68 98 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). Note that the standard
is a "compelling" state interest, as opposed to an "im-
portant" state interest required in Ohralik. 98 S. Ct. at
1920.
6998 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting 424 U.S. at 25).
Primus-that is, prevention of "undue influence,
overreaching, misrepresentation, invasion of pri-
vacy, conflict of interest, lay interference, and other
evils thought to inhere generally in solicitation by
lawyers of prospective clients, and to be present on
the record before us." 70 The Court stated that,
although in Chralik wholly commercial conduct
was subject to broad prophylactic rules, such rules
dealing with associational freedoms are suspect.
7 1
Therefore, "precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms."
72
The Primus Court concluded that the South Car-
olina disciplinary rules swept so broadly that they
had "a distinct potential for dampening the kind
of 'cooperative activity that would make advocacy
of litigation meaningful,'... as well as for permit-
ting discretionary enforcement against unpopular
causes."73 The Court also found that the alleged
state interests were unsupported by the record. The
Court found no evidence that Primus' solicitation
letter was misleading, involved an invasion of pri-
vacy or provided a significant opportunity for ov-
erreaching, coercion, conflict of interest or lay in-
terference with the attorney-client relationship.
The Court noted that for the state to establish an
interest in regulating solicitation it must show that
the solicitation was malicious or for pecuniary gain
serving no public interest.74 This South Carolina had
failed to do. Hence, the Court concluded, although
broad prophylactic regulations of solicitation were
permissible 'for purely commercial transactions
such as found in Ohralik, those prophylactic regu-
lations could not stand consistently with the first
amendment, where political expression and asso-
ciation would be abridged.7 5
The remainder of the opinion noted that the
state might continue to regulate time, place, and
7098 S. Ct. at 1905.
71Id. (quoting 371 U.S. at 438).
72 98 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting 371 U.S. at 438).
7"98 S. Ct. at 1905 (citations omitted). Among the
reasons for concluding the rules swept too broadly were
that they pqrmitted punishment for solicitation in the
absence of proof of any specific evils and that people in
any way associated with the organization must suppress
giving advice in fear of disciplinary action. Id.
74 Id. at 1907.7 Id. at 1908. The Court recognized that the line
between those activities permissibly regulated prophy-
lactically and those which could not legally be so regu-
lated would be difficult to draw. The Court also con-
cluded that "that is no reason for avoiding the undertak-
ing." Id. at 1908 n.32. •
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manner of solicitation; draw narrow rules to deal
with harm resulting from solicitation; and insist
that lay organizations not exert actual control over
ensuing litigation.7 6 Although the regulations in
Primus were found to be unconstitutionally broad,
the Court stated that carefully tailored regulations
would not necessarily abridge first amendment
freedoms. 77
ANALYSIS
There is little doubt, as Justice Marshall noted
in his concurring opinion, that the disparate fac-
tual situations of Ohralik and Primus made it easy
for the Court to avoid discussion of an intermediate
"benign" type of solicitation-that is, an offer of
truthful legal advice or information to someone
capable of freely and rationally choosing to accept
or reject it.7 8 The disparate facts also allowed the
Court to avoid a second line-drawing problem-that
between pure commercial speech or conduct, and
non-commercial speech. However, such line-draw-
ing is crucial in light of the radically different levels
of scrutiny afforded commercial and non-commer-
cial speech.
As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent,
the Court's traditional "commonsense" distinctions
between commercial and non-commercial speech
are inadequate. 9 These "commonsense" distinc-
tions were first recognized by the Court in a foot-
note to -the Virginia Board decision: a) the dissemi-
nator of commercial information would supposedly
know more about his product than would, for
example, a news reporter, and therefore the com-
mercial speaker was said to be more able to verify
the truth of his speech; b) since advertising was
considered the "sine qua non of commercial profits,"
there would be little likelihood that such advertis-
ing would be chilled; and c) the hardiness of
advertising made it less necessary to tolerate inac-
curate statements for fear of chilling the speaker.80
After this perfunctory introduction to the "com-
monsense" distinctions between commercial and
7"Justices Marshall and Blackmun felt that this para-
graph of the opinion was dicta. 98 S. Ct. at 1909 (Black-
mun, J., concurring) and 98 S. Ct. at 1927 (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part).
"7 However, the Court declined to delineate the precise
areas of permissible state regulation. 98 S. Ct. at 1908
n.33.
7s Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. at 1927
n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
7 98 S. Ct. at 1910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
""425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
non-commercial speech, those distinctions were re-
garded as being well-established in Bates. There,
the Court relied on the "knowledge of the dissem-
inator" and the hardiness of commercial speech to
support its conclusion that the first amendment
overbreadth doctrine was not applicable to com-
mercial speech."1 The Bates Court added to the list
of "commonsense" distinctions its observation that
commercial speech was generally more calculated
than non-commercial speech, so that strict require-
ments of truthfulness not allowed under traditional
first amendment protection would involve little
chance of inhibiting the spontaneity of commercial
speech.s2
Primus accepted these assumptions without
closely examining their validity. However, it is not
self-evident that the disseminator of commercial
information knows more about his product than
does the news reporter, since a retail merchant who
advertises may be less able to vouch for the truth
of his statements than the news reporter, who has
intensively investigated his story. Similarly, if the
Court is correct in its observation that advertising
is the "sine qua non of commercial profits," such
advertising may be especially necessary for the
small or newly-established business. To chill the
access to the advertising marketplace of such a
commercial enterprise may well limit its ability to
compete with larger businesses able to hire profes-
sionals to untangle the protected from the unpro-
tected. And finally, if spontaneity of speech is a
factor in determining first amendment protection,
then the politician who "shoots from the hip"
would be on safer ground than those who carefully
prepare what they say.83
In Qhralik, the Court distinguished commercial
from non-commercial speech based on a new "com-
monsense" observation-that speech proposing a
commercial transaction "occurs in an area tradi-
tionally subject to government regulation." 4 How-
ever, the areas of traditional government regulation
cited by the Court involved what the Court
had classified as conduct mixed with speech ele-
ments-for example, the exchange of securities
information and corporate proxy statements.ss The
Court placed Ohralik's solicitation in this conduct
categoryM thereby implying that the solicitation
"' 433 U.S. at 381.82 Id. at 383.
83See Note, 68J. CRM. L. & C. 624, 631-32 (1977).





was purely commercial speech,' and accorded it only
limited first amendment protection.ss Hence, the
distinction between commercial conduct and
speech may, in reality, have been a mere shorthand
method for concluding how much first amendment
protection the Court wished to recognize.
The majority of cases cited in support of conduct
being traditionally subject to regulation did not,
however, consider the first amendment implica-
tions.' One case which did consider the first
amendment, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,so
dealt with picketing of a place of business to induce
the owner not to sell to non-union peddlers. In
Giboney, the picketing considered to be conduct
subject to regulation was part of an illegal course
of action in violation of antitrust laws.91
Meanwhile, the Chralik Court failed to mention
cases which held that "regulatory measures ... no
matter how sophisticated, cannot be employed in
purpose or in effect to stifle, penalize or curb the
exercise of First Amendment rights. ' 'o2 Placing
Ohralik's solicitation in the conduct category there-
fore only suggested that his activity was commer-
cial, not that it was necessarily outside the first
amendment protection afforded other types of
commercial speech.
Similarly, Ohralik'failed to support its conclusion
that the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of
commercial speech restrictions was lower than that
of restrictions on non-commercial speech. The
Court attempted to justify this undefined lower
' In its discussion of conduct traditionally subject to
regulation the Court cited examples of purely commercial
transactions involving speech elements. Id. at 1918-20.
The Court then placed Ohralik's solicitation within this
conduct category, Id. at 1919, thereby implying the con-
clusion that Ohralik's solicitation was also a purely com-
mercial transaction. This conclusion is supported by the
Court's summary of its Ohralik holding in Pdn : "Under
certain circumstances, [prophylactic regulation] ... is
appropriate in the case of speech that simply 'propose[s]
a commercial transaction,' Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human
Relations Comn,.... See Ohralik." In re Primus, 98 S. Ct.
at 1908.
98 S. Ct. at 1920.
8 id. at 1919 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
395 U.S. 575 (1969)).
go 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
" Id. at 502, 504.
' Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961)
(statute to force NAACP registration of members). Cf.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (statute
requiring prior authorization to distribute religious pam-
phlets).
level of scrutiny by declaring that it was necessary
to prevent dilution of the broader first amendment
protection enjoyed by non-commercial speech.93
Potential dilution of traditional first amendment
protection was not a factor considered in earlier
commercial speech cases, which relied on the "har-
diness" of commercial speech to support the differ-
ent levels of protection.94 The Coulrt seemed to
assume that if the protection was to be equal for
commercial and non-commercial speakers alike,
the result would be a weakening of protection of
the latter, rather than a strengthening of the pro-
tection enjoyed by the former. The Court could
just as easily have upheld full first amendment
protection for commercial speech, including solici-
tation.
In Virginia Board and Bates the Court had em-
phasized the positive aspects of professional adver-
tising. It noted that advertising was a means by
which the professional could "reach out and serve
the community" by providing information about
his services. 5 And, while recognizing the problems
of advertising, the Court stated that it "is nonethe-
less dissemination of information as to who is pro-
ducing and selling what product, for what reason,
at what price." That information, the Court rea-
soned, was essential to enlightened public decision-
making.' In each of these cases the asserted evils
of advertising were weighed against the benefits.
And, although it was recognized that advertising
might have an adverse effect on the administration
of justice by "stirring up litigation," the Court
noted that "we cannot accept the notion that it is
always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently
than to redress it by legal action." 97
By contrast, when presented with the allegation
in Ohralik that solicitation would "stir up litigation,"
the Court did not we.gh potential harms against
benefits. Instead, it accepted Ohralik's concession
that there were potential harms associated with
solicitation, and that the state had a right to pre-
vent them.U The Court did not analyze each sug-
gested potential harm in Ohralik to determine
whether in fact it was directly connected with
solicitation. In contrast, Bates considered each in-
dividual alleged harm to determine its relationship
with advertising and to ascertain any countervail-
9398 S. Ct. at 1918. SeeaLso note 21 supra and accom-
panying text.
94 &e 433 U.S. at 381; 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
95 433 US. at 370.
96 425 US. at 765.
97433 US. at 376.
9 98 S. Ct. at 1922.
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ing value of the advertisements. 99 Hence, in Ohralik
the Court may have loaded its scales for weighing
state interests and first amendment rights, by look-
ing only to the possible harms of solicitation and
by not further considering the positive aspects of
solicitation.
The existence of countervailing positive aspects
of solicitation was suggested in one footnote of the
Ohralik opinion. Here, the Court acknowledged
"the importance of providing low and middle in-
come individuals with adequate information about
the availability of legal services."' However, the
Court did not directly consider the informative
aspects of solicitation. Rather, it suggested alter-
native means of communicating this information,
including advertising. But, advertising is generally
cost-effective only in standard areas of legal work,
and may not provide the individual attention and
advice of a personal consultation or solicitation.
10 1
And even when misused, as in Ohralik, the "clients"
were nevertheless provided with some information
about their legal rights and remedies.'
02
Qhralik presumed that most attorneys would take
advantage of their training in the "art of persua-
sion" by playing on the weakness of potential
clients. The Court assumed that, given the freedom
to solicit clients, lawyers would immediately turn
into the proverbial "ambulance chasers." By con-
trast, in the previous year, the Court in Bates had
rejected assertions that lawyers would misuse the
right to advertise by stating:
We suspect that, with advertising, most lawyers will
behave as they always have: They will abide by their
solemn oaths to uphold the integrity and honor of
their profession and of the legal system. For every
attorney who overreaches through advertising, there
will be thousands of others who will be candid and
honest and straightforward." 3
9For example, the claim in Bates that advertising
would have an undesirable economic effect was not
merely assumed to be true. Rather, the Court analyzed
these arguments and found them to be "dubious at best."
433 U.S. at 377.
1"098 S. Ct. at 1919 n.15.
101 In Bates the Court recognized the fact that "many
services performed by attorneys are indeed unique [such
that] it is doubtful that any attorney would or could
advertise fixed prices for services of that type." 433 U.S.
at 372.
2Justice Marshall noted in his concurrence that de-
spite Ohralik's questionable methods, he "advised both
his clients (apparently correctly) that, although they had
been injured by an uninsured motorist, they could none-
theless recover on the McClintock's insurance policy." 98
S. Ct. at 1928 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
"o3 433 U.S. at 379.
It is unclear why the Bates Court laid one to
thousands oddsl°4 in favor of scrupulous attorneys
who advertise, while in Ohralik it viewed solicitation
by attorneys as "more often than not ... injurious
to the person solicited."' 0' 5 As noted in Bates, "[tihe
appropriate response to a fraud is a sanction ad-
dressed to that problem alone, not a sanction that
unduly burdens a legitimate activity.''I 6
Ohral'ik also virtually ignored the emphasis of
previous cases on the first amendment right of
consumers to information. The Court dismissed
this interest by concluding that "[i]n-person solici-
tation is as likely as not to discourage persons
needing counsel from engaging in a critical com-
parison of the 'availability, nature, and prices' of
legal services [so that] ... it actually may disserve
the individual and societal interest, identified in
Bates, in facilitating 'informed and reliable deci-
sion-making.""07 And "[a]lthough it is argued that
personal solicitation is valuable because it may
apprise a victim of misfortune of his or her legal
rights, the very plight of that person not only makes
him or her more vulnerable to influence but also
may make advice all the more intrusive."' ' Virginia
Board had offered an alternative to that highly
protective attitude by stating that the Court must
"assume that this information is not in itself harm-
ful, that people will perceive their own best inter-
ests if only they are well enough informed, and
that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather 'than to close
them."' 9 The Bates Court "view[ed] as dubious
any justification that is based on the benefits of
public ignorance,"'1 suggesting that "[i]f the
naivet6 of the public will cause advertising by
attorneys to be misleading, then it is the bar's role
to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed
as to enable it to place advertising in its proper
perspective. '
Although the potential harms caused by solici-
tation may be greater than those caused by adver-
tising, the Court has not required a presentation of
1
4 Id.
098 S. Ct. at 1924. Granted, the facts in Ohralik
indicate abuse of solicitation. But the facts in Primus do
not. Additionally, despite the Court's labelling of Primus'
activities as political expression, they were nonetheless
solicitation and therefore subject to the same types of
misuse feared in Ohralik.
"w 433 U.S. at 375 n.31.
'07 98 S. Ct. at 1919 (citations omitted).
'' Id. at 1923.
'34 2 5 U.S. at 770.




facts to verify such a conclusion. It therefore seems
particularly unreasonable for the Court to empha-
size so strongly the negative aspects of solicitation
per se. In upholding the constitutionality of Ohio's
disciplinary rules-rules which banned all solici-
tation, including intermediate "benign"
types-the Court may have taken an unjustified
step back to its highly protective, pre-advertising
stance. If, however, Ohralik was really concerned
with the actual harm suggested, although not
proven, then its extensive dicta regarding the po-
tential evils of all solicitation disserves consumers
in that it may deter future attorney solicitation and
thereby chill some of the information which would
otherwise flow freely to an informed and reliable
decision-making public.1
1 2
The position of the soliciting attorney is now
unclear. If charged with commercial solicitation,
he may attempt to show his solicitation was privi-
leged by motives which were political, associational
or related to mutual assistance." 3 As pointed out
by Justice Rehnquist in dissent, the Court is vir-
tually encouraging an attorney to engage in a
"sham" to gain first amendment protection."" Al-
though the Court has seen through shams before" 5
most solicitation involves some informative fac-
tors."6 Even in Primus the Court ignored some
potential pecuniary gain" 7 in light of its conclusion
that Primus' primary motivation was political
expression.
If the attorney cannot show a relationship be-
tween his solicitation and "core first amendment
freedoms" of political expression, association, and
112 433 U.S. at 364. See 425 U.S. at 765.
"Ste Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. at
1920; In re Primus, 98 S. Ct. at 1906.114 98 S. Ct. at 1910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
s Compare Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942) with New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
116 Cf. 425 U.S. at 764-65 (informative value of phar-
macist's advertising).
17 See note 66 supra.
mutual assistance, he could argue that his solici-
tation was not "pure commercial *speech," but
rather that it served an informative purpose. Then,
it could be distinguishable from the "traditional
areas of government regulation" cited in Ohralik.
Similarly, he might argue that his professional
character would lower, not increase, the potential
for misuse, and that the consumer's need and right
to tailored, individual information is served
through the personal consultation of in-person so-
licitation. Marshallian statistics to support such
assertions of public need would be beneficial."
8
Finally, the attorney involved in "benign" com-
mercial solicitation should avoid conceding the
existence of potential harms connected with solici-
tation. Such concessions in Ohralik permitted the
Court to sidestep in-depth analysis of the asserted
harms of solicitation.
CONCLUSION
In light of the limited first amendment protec-
tion already recognized for restrained, truthful
professional advertising, the Court may be forced
to accord similar protection to the intermediate
form of "benign" solicitation. Such limited protec-
tion might permit strict rules aimed specifically at
abuses of the solicitation privilege, rather than at
"benign" solicitation. However, until such a case
arises, attorneys must draw the illusive line between
"solicitation of clients in person, for pecuniary gain,
under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the
State has a right to prevent""19 and other forms of
solicitation involving political, associational or mu-
tual assistance elements.
"
8 See, e.g., 98 S. Ct. at 1928 n.4. (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part). In this footnote Marshall notes an ABA
Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs report that
there appears to be substantial underutilization of law-
yers' services, especially among the middle-class majority
of this country.
"9 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S. Ct. at 1915.
